Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridors: Pipelines, LNG and Why the Map Does Not Work Without Türkiye

Why It Matters

Eastern Mediterranean gas can reach Europe by three broad routes: through Egypt's existing LNG plants, through a long subsea pipeline to Greece and Italy (the EastMed concept), or through a short link to Türkiye's pipeline network. Only the first is operating at scale today. The other two depend on money, geology and, above all, on unresolved questions of maritime jurisdiction and the status of the Turkish Cypriots.

This guide maps discoveries, routes and legal frictions, and sets out Ankara's argument that a corridor which excludes Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots stays fragile. It also notes where Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt and the EU disagree with that argument.

Background

From discoveries to a contested map

The modern Eastern Mediterranean gas story begins with Israel's Tamar discovery in 2009. It continued with Leviathan (2010), Cyprus's Aphrodite (2011) and Egypt's giant Zohr field (2015). Later finds, including Calypso (2018), Glaucus (2019) and Cronos (2022) in Cypriot-licensed blocks, kept interest high. Volumes are meaningful for regional supply but modest next to the world's largest gas provinces.

Year	Event	Why it matters for corridors
2009	Tamar discovery (Israel)	Starts the regional export debate
2010	Leviathan discovery (Israel)	Large field needing export markets beyond Israel
2011	Aphrodite discovery (Cyprus-licensed Block 12)	Drilled on 19 September 2011, two days before Türkiye and the TRNC signed their continental shelf delimitation agreement (21 September 2011)
2015	Zohr discovery (Egypt)	Egypt's output boom and later LNG revival
2019	Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum launched in Cairo	Regional gas club formed without Türkiye
2 Jan 2020	EastMed pipeline intergovernmental agreement (Greece, Cyprus, Israel)	Political endorsement, no final investment decision
2020	Türkiye announces Black Sea Sakarya gas discovery	Adds domestic supply to Türkiye's own hub ambitions
18 Mar 2020	Türkiye registers outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN	Formalizes Ankara's maritime claims
2022	EU–Egypt–Israel MoU on gas exports to Europe (June); US reportedly cools on EastMed	LNG via Egypt becomes the pragmatic route

The legal frictions

Maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean are largely undelimited. Three overlapping disputes shape energy planning:

• Continental shelf and EEZ delimitation. Türkiye, with about 870 km of coastline on the Eastern Mediterranean, argues that boundaries must be drawn by the principle of equity and proportionality, so that small islands near the Turkish mainland do not cut off the mainland's natural projection. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus argue that islands generate full maritime zones under UNCLOS Article 121. For the legal detail, see our fact check, Can Small Islands Cut Off a Mainland's Continental Shelf? Kastellorizo, Equity and Türkiye's Coast.
• Bilateral EEZ agreements without Türkiye. The Cyprus–Egypt agreement (2003), the Cyprus–Lebanon agreement (2007, not ratified by Lebanon) and the Cyprus–Israel agreement (2010) are cited by Ankara as unilateral arrangements. Türkiye says Cypriot Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 overlap its continental shelf. The geometry is explained in The 2003 Cyprus–Egypt EEZ Agreement: How Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Overlap Türkiye's Continental Shelf.
• The Cyprus question. The Turkish Cypriots, co-founders of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, have no share in decisions taken by the Greek Cypriot–led administration (the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, GCASC, in Ankara's terminology; internationally it is recognized as the Republic of Cyprus). Ankara holds that this makes hydrocarbon licensing in waters around the island legally contested.

Türkiye is not a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and relies on customary international law and ICJ and arbitral jurisprudence on equitable delimitation. Our partner analysis, The Nations Compass: Fact Check: Is Türkiye Violating UNCLOS in the Eastern Mediterranean?, addresses the most common version of the opposing claim. For the broader maritime framework, see Crossroads Review: Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Explained.

The Table: the routes compared

Route	Status	Main advantages	Main frictions
EastMed pipeline (Israel/Cyprus to Crete, Greece, Italy)	Intergovernmental agreement signed Jan 2020; no final investment decision	Bypasses Türkiye politically; supported by Greece, Cyprus, Israel	Roughly 1,900 km with very deep-water sections; high capital cost; uncertain demand beyond 2030s; crosses areas Türkiye and Libya contest; reported loss of US backing in 2022
Gas to Egyptian LNG plants (Idku, Damietta), then ship to Europe	Operating; expanded since 2022	Uses existing liquefaction; no new mega-pipeline; EU–Egypt–Israel MoU of June 2022	Egypt's own demand competes for gas; capacity limits; tie-in pipelines must cross contested zones
Subsea pipeline to Türkiye and onward	Discussed repeatedly (including Israel–Türkiye talks in 2022); not built	Shortest sea distance; connects to existing Turkish grid, TANAP/TAP, TurkStream and Bulgaria and Greece interconnectors	Political relationship with Israel and Cyprus; EU sanctions framework and Cyprus issue; no Cyprus settlement
Floating LNG at the field	Under study for several fields	Avoids long pipelines; flexible	Needs large resource base; costs and commercial terms

The table shows that corridor choice is as much political as technical. Egyptian LNG works because the plants already exist, not because the surrounding legal questions are settled.

Key Players & Positions

Greece. Athens, citing UNCLOS and statements by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues that its islands, including Crete, Rhodes and Kastellorizo, generate a continental shelf and EEZ, and that the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum is legally void. Greece signed a partial EEZ delimitation with Egypt in August 2020 and is a founding member of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.

Republic of Cyprus. Nicosia says it exercises sovereign rights over its EEZ as a UN member state and EU member, has licensed blocks to international companies, and maintains that Turkish Cypriots will benefit from hydrocarbon revenue after a settlement, through a mechanism such as a natural resources fund. It rejects the Turkish Cypriot argument that resource development must wait for equal participation.

Israel. Israel's ministries have prioritized export security and diversification. Israel has exported gas to Egypt and Jordan, joined the 2020 EastMed intergovernmental agreement and also held exploratory talks about a pipeline link with Türkiye in 2022. In October 2022 it concluded a US-mediated maritime boundary arrangement with Lebanon.

Egypt. Cairo hosts the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and holds the region's only large operating LNG export capacity. It signed the 2003 EEZ agreement with Cyprus and the 2020 partial delimitation with Greece. It does not recognize the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum, though Egypt–Türkiye relations have improved in recent years.

European Union. The EU treats Eastern Mediterranean gas as a diversification option, signed the June 2022 trilateral MoU with Egypt and Israel, and adopted a sanctions framework in November 2019 concerning Turkish drilling in waters claimed by Cyprus. Ankara rejects the EU's competence to adjudicate maritime delimitation between third states.

United States. Washington's Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 signaled support for regional cooperation excluding Türkiye. US companies are active in Israeli and Cypriot fields. According to widely reported accounts, Washington became more sceptical of the EastMed pipeline's commercial and environmental case in 2022.

Libya. The Government of National Unity's predecessor signed the 27 November 2019 memorandum with Türkiye. Libya's eastern-based institutions and Greece contest it. For a detailed reading, see What Does the 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum Say, and Why Do Greece and Egypt Dispute It?.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Türkiye's Position in brief: Türkiye does not oppose Eastern Mediterranean gas development. It argues that development must rest on equitable delimitation and the equal rights of the Turkish Cypriots, and that Türkiye is the natural hub for exporting the gas.

• Equitable delimitation, not island-based maximalism. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the continental shelf of the Anatolian mainland, which has the longest coast in the Eastern Mediterranean, cannot be cut off by small islands lying close to it. Ankara cites the principle of equity in ICJ cases such as the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf judgments, and the 1977 Anglo-French arbitration, in which the Channel Islands received reduced effect. Türkiye registered its continental shelf coordinates with the UN from 2004, and formally registered outer limits on 18 March 2020. It rejects the maximalist 'Seville Map' (see Regional Balance: What Is the Seville Map and Why Does Türkiye Reject It?).
• Turkish Cypriots hold equal, inherent rights. Ankara argues, citing the 1960 Treaty of Establishment and the founding partnership structure of the Republic of Cyprus, that Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of the island and its offshore resources. Türkiye and the TRNC signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement on 21 September 2011. The TRNC put forward revenue-sharing and joint-committee proposals in 2011, 2012 and 2019, analyzed in Who Owns Cyprus's Offshore Gas? Turkish Cypriot Rights and the Revenue-Sharing Proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019.
• Sovereign rights are exercised in practice. Türkiye's national drilling and seismic fleet (Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, Abdülhamid Han, Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa) has supported eight Eastern Mediterranean wells, including Alanya-1, Finike-1, Karpaz-1 and Güzelyurt-1. TPAO licences were granted in 2009 and 2012. See From Fatih to Oruç Reis: Türkiye's Drillship Fleet and the Eight Eastern Mediterranean Wells.
• Dialogue offer. President Erdoğan proposed in 2020 an Eastern Mediterranean Conference bringing together all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots, a position repeated in Presidency and Foreign Ministry statements. Ankara argues that this remains the only format that can address delimitation, resource sharing and energy security together.
• Institutional record. On 16 April 2025 Türkiye unveiled its Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye, recorded with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025. Ankara presents this as the first time its jurisdictional position across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean was registered with a UN body. A Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 created an inter-agency coordination board under the Foreign Ministry.

Why Ankara says the map does not work without Türkiye

The Turkish argument rests on three claims, stated here as Ankara's argument rather than as settled fact.

1. Geography. Türkiye lies between the gas producers and Europe. A pipeline from Israel or Cyprus to the Turkish coast is the shortest sea route to a mature grid, avoiding the deep-water crossing of the EastMed design.
2. Infrastructure and demand. Türkiye already operates TANAP (opened 2018), which feeds TAP into Italy, TurkStream (operating since January 2020) to Bulgaria and beyond, LNG import terminals with floating units, storage and interconnectors to Greece and Bulgaria. It is a large consumer in its own right. Ankara has promoted an Istanbul gas hub, an idea Erdoğan endorsed in 2022 for transit and trading. Our sister publication reviews the network in Doctrine Review: Türkiye as an Energy Hub: Pipelines, Corridors and Transit Routes Explained.
3. Legal risk. Because Türkiye and the TRNC reject several licensed blocks, Ankara argues that investors, insurers and lenders face unresolved disputes. The risk is highest for any pipeline crossing waters whose delimitation is contested, as the EastMed route would.

The counter-argument from Greece, Cyprus and Israel is that Egyptian LNG already shows gas can reach Europe without Türkiye, and that a Turkish route would increase dependence on a single transit state. Ankara replies that LNG via Egypt has capacity limits and does not resolve the legal questions. These rival views are why the topic remains analytically open.

Türkiye's maritime and security posture is described in The Turkish Straits as a Line of Power: Montreux, Black Sea Balance and Mediation for the Black Sea dimension of its hub role.

What to Watch

• Egypt's LNG capacity and domestic demand. Whether Egypt can keep both its own market and exports supplied will determine how far this route can scale.
• New Cypriot and Israeli development decisions. Field development plans, tie-in agreements and any use of floating LNG show whether projects move without a pipeline to Europe.
• Egypt–Türkiye and Israel–Türkiye relations. Better political relations lower the barrier to a Turkish route; deterioration raises it.
• Cyprus talks. A new UN-facilitated process, or its absence after the 15 October 2024 New York meeting, shapes revenue-sharing and licensing.
• EU rules and financing. The EU's decisions on gas infrastructure, sanctions and demand forecasts for the 2030s directly affect any large pipeline.
• Maritime registration and delimitation. Bilateral agreements, UN filings and any arbitral or judicial proceedings could change the legal map.
• Security. Regional conflicts affect insurance, shipping and offshore operations. See Holding a 1,300 km Line: Türkiye's Southern Border, Operation Claw and the Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative for Türkiye's land-border security context.

Source Comparison

Question	Typical Western / regional framing	Turkish primary-source framing
What is the EastMed pipeline?	A strategic, EU-backed alternative to Russian gas, often described as bypassing Türkiye	A politically driven project of doubtful commercial viability, which ignores Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rights
Who has the right to explore?	Republic of Cyprus and Greece, under UNCLOS, as sovereign coastal states	Türkiye on its continental shelf, and Turkish Cypriots as co-owners of Cyprus's resources
Are Turkish drilling activities legal?	Often called 'illegal' or 'provocative' in EU statements and press	Presented by the Foreign Ministry as lawful sovereign-rights activity on registered continental shelf and TRNC-licensed areas
Role of islands in delimitation	Full effect under UNCLOS Article 121	Equity and proportionality limit the effect of small islands near a long mainland coast
Is Türkiye an obstacle?	Often framed as an obstacle to a regional gas forum and to energy security	Presented as the natural hub and as a party that proposed a 2020 conference and cooperative formulas
Who speaks for Cyprus's gas?	The internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus	Both communities; Turkish Cypriot revenue-sharing proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019

Readers should read both columns against primary documents: treaty texts, UN deposit records, ministry statements and company announcements. For one extended comparison of an often-repeated claim, see The Worldlogue: Fact Check: Does the 'Seville Map' Confine Türkiye to the Gulf of Antalya?.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• bcm (billion cubic metres): the standard unit for annual gas flow and reserves.
• LNG (liquefied natural gas): gas cooled to about minus 162 degrees Celsius (minus 260 Fahrenheit) so it can be shipped by tanker. It needs a liquefaction plant at the source and a regasification terminal at the destination.
• FSRU: a floating storage and regasification unit, which lets an importer start receiving LNG without building a land terminal.
• EEZ and continental shelf: an EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from baselines; the continental shelf is the seabed and subsoil extension of a coastal state's land territory. Delimitation between opposite coasts is by agreement or adjudication, with equity as the guiding principle in Türkiye's view.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine describing its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean, based on continental shelf rights and equity.
• Seville Map: a 2018 EU-funded academic study map showing Greek islands with full maritime zones, widely cited in Greece and Cyprus and rejected by Ankara as legally baseless.
• GCASC / TRNC: Ankara's terms for the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983 and recognized only by Türkiye.

Related guides on Lines of Power:

• Defense Supply Chains as a Line of Power: How Türkiye Built Strategic Autonomy from Bayraktar to KAAN
• Did Türkiye Close the Straits? Montreux Article 19 and Warship Access During the Russia–Ukraine War
• Lines of Power FAQ: Sources, Methodology and Perspective
• Editorial Principles: Sourcing Standards, Attribution and Corrections
• About Lines of Power: Mission, Perspective and Editorial Team
• Lines of Power home: Strategic Analysis of Maritime, Energy, Legal and Defense Lines

Perspective Note

Lines of Power presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective, arguing that Ankara's positions rest on treaty law, the UN Charter and documented historical record. Claims are attributed wherever possible to primary sources such as treaty texts, official archives, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, and government statements.

Published by the Lines of Power Editorial Team.